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I. INTRODUCTION
Major ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, along with glaciers
across the world, are melting due to increases in the global
temperature.' The runoff water and ice breaks associated with this
warming end up in the world's oceans and contributes to the rise in
sea level.2 Accelerated melting has led scientists to predict that sea
levels could rise between 4 and 9.5 inches by 2100.3 This poses a
particular danger for the east coast of the United States, where
metropolitan cities may lose an estimated $7.4 trillion in assets by
2050 alone.4 For Boston, these risks come with an estimated price
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1. See TIM LENTON, ET AL., MAJOR TIPPING POINTS IN EARTH'S CLIMATE
SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR, 9-12 (Nov. 2009),
http://vww.worldwildlife.org/climate/Publications/WWFBinaryiteml14354.pdf.
2. See Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise, EN VTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/index.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2011).
3. Glaciers and Ice Caps to Dominate Sea Level Rise this Century, Says -New
Study, SCIENCE DAILY, (July 20, 2007), available at http://vww.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2007/07/070719143502.htin.
4. Bennie Dinardo, Boston Faces Deep Risk from Sea Level Rise, BOSTON
GLOBE (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/greenblog/
2009/11 /boston faces deep risk from se.html. Global warming presents threats
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tag of $463 million;5 the New York-Newark area stands to lose
approximately $1.8 trillion.6  While there is a heavy debate in
American politics as to whether climate change is anthropogenic, the
scientific consensus states that global warming is a result of increased
emissions of greenhouse gases into the air, which trap radiant heat in
Earth atmosphere, thereby increasing its average temperature.7 A
prevalent greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide (CO 2); a byproduct of
burning organic matter, in particular fossil fuels.8 In an attempt to
mitigate the effects of global warning, and thereby the potential
damage which might befall them from rising sea levels, ten northeast
states agreed in 2003 to establish a cap-and-trade strategy to
gradually reduce carbon dioxide emissions by power producers.9
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cap-and-trade
system among the states of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Maine,
and Rhode Island.10 These signatory states signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to memorialize their commitment to the
RGGI. 1  The terms of the MOU require each state to adopt
independent legislation establishing a cap on carbon emissions
created by power producers within the signatory state, and establish
an auction system for carbon allowances. 12 The MOU requires each
to biodiversity, and threatens deserts, rainforests and coral reefs. Biodiversity,
GLOBAL IsSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/issue/169/biodiversity (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011). Furthermore, climate change increases the habitable areas of
disease spreading insects such as mosquitoes and the tsetse fly. AL GORE, AN
INCONVENIENT TRUTH 172 (2006).
5. LENTON et al., supra note 1, at 33; Dinardo, supra note 4.
6. LENTON et al., supra note 1, at 33; Dinardo, supra note 4.
7. See Global Climate Change, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION, http://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
8. See id.
9. See Guy Page, Vermont and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
VERMONT ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 3., 2009), http://www.vtep.org/documents/
vtepbriefingpaper.pdf.
10. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Memorandum of Understanding,
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 1 (DEC. 20, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/
docs/mou 12 20_05.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of U/nderstanding].
1 1. See id. at 12-20.
12. See id, at 2-3; see also Michael Smith, Murky Precedent AIeets Hazy Air:
The Compact Clause and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVT'L
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state to designate at least 25% of these proceeds from these
allowance auctions toward consumer benefit programs.'3 Each state
retains the right to unilaterally alter or repeal its own RGGI
legislation, and a signatory state can withdraw from RGGI at will.14
In light of the recent budgetary difficulties befalling states, some
RGGI signatory states have started to dip into these established
consumer and energy efficiency funds.'5  Environmental
conservation advocates argue that this practice sets a poor precedent,
which ultimately undennines the intent behind RGGI. 6
Simultaneously, in 2011, New Hampshire unsuccessfully initiated
retraction of their RGGI legislation.' 7  New Jersey governor Chris
Christie was soon to follow suit by withdrawing New Jersey from the
AFF. L. REV. 387, 404-06 (2007); J. Jared Snyder, Regional and State Programs;
Measuring, Allocating, Trading, and Complying, SM106 ALl-ABA 91, at 7-8
(Mar. 23, 2007).
13. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 6.
14. See id, at 9. In 2011. the New Hampshire House of Representatives
attempted to withdraw from RGGI, and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
retracted all RGGI legislation. New Hampshire Governor Vetoes RGGI
Withdrawal Bill, POWER (July 13, 2011), http://vww.powermag.com/
POWERnews/New-Hampshire-Governor-Vetoes-RGGI-Withdawal-
Bill 3856.html; Mireva Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey from 10 State Climate
Initiative, NY TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011), http://ww.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/
nvregion/christie-pulls-nj -from-greenhouse-gas-coalition.htm 1.
15. See e.g., Joey Peters, The RGGI Raid: How Cap-and-Trade Revenues 1ent
to Fix State Budgets, STATELINE (June 26., 2010), http://vww.stateline.org/live/
details/storv?contentid=494460; Bob Sanders, W1arnings Realized in RGGI Budget
Raid NEW HAMPSHIRE BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.nhbr.com/
businessnews/statenews/764176-257/wxxarnings-realized-in-rggi-budget-raid.html;
States Raid RGGI Funds to Fill Budget Gaps, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Dec.
21, 2010), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2010/12/21/states-raid-rggi-funds-
to-fill-budget-gaps/' Northeast States Raiding RGGI Money to Stay Afloat, MAINE
PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.mpbn.net/Home/
tabid/36/ctl/Viewitem/mid/3478/Itemid/14576/Default.aspx.
16. See Centers for Working Families, et. al, Re: Governor Paterson's
Proposed Raid of RGGI Monies, NYSERDA, 2-3 (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://,ww.nvserda.org/RGGIProgram%20Planning/pace nrdc and environment
al advocates of ny part2.pdf.
17. See New Hampshire Governor Vetoes RGGI Wlithdrau4al Bill, supra note
14. New Hampshire Governor John Lynch vetoed the House's attempted retraction
of RGGI legislation. Id.
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program in 2011.18 Striking yet another blow to the agreement,
Indeck Energy challenged New York's system, alleging the program
to be illegal.19
This Note will analyze the applicability of the U.S. Constitution's
Compact Clause on the RGGI. Of particular relevance are RGGI's
vulnerabilities under both the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause. Finally, this Note will analyze the advantages of
congressional consent to this multi-state compact as a means to cure
these constitutional defects and rectify enforcement predicaments
RGGI faces.
II. RGGI: ITs FORMATION AND APPLICATION
a. RGGI in General
RGGI is the brainchild of Governor George Pataki of New York,
who in 2003 sent eleven letters to governors of northeastern states
inviting them to develop a regional cap-and-trade system to govern
carbon emissions from power utilities. 20 In 2005, signatory states
drafted and agreed to an MOU. 2 1 The RGGI cap-and-trade system
works by first establishing a base annual emissions budget for the
region. This value is then divided and apportioned accordingly,
based on the energy needs of the different states partaking in the
initiative.22 Starting in 2015, this budget will shrink by 2.5% per
year, so that by the year 2018. each participating state shall have
reduced its annual emissions by 10%.23 Once an individual state's
emissions budget is set, it is free to establish a scheme in which
18. See Navarro, supra note 14.
19. The suit was ultimately settled by New York. Gil Keteltas, The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) litigation settled, GLOBAL CLIMATE LAW BLOG
(Jan. 6, 2010), http://,ww.globalclimatelawx.com/2010/01/articles/climate-change-
litigation/regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-rggi-litigation-
settled/?utm source-feedburner&utin medium-feed&utm-campaign=Feed% 3A+
GlobalClimateLawBlog %28Global+Climate+Law+Blog%29.
20. See Governor Pataki Announces Regional Agreement to Curb Greenhouse
Gases, NY DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERV.. (Jan. 2006), http://www.dec.nv.gov/
environmentdec/18981.htmL
21. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 12-20.
22. See idat 2-3.
23. See id. at 3.
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would-be emitters purchase CO2 emission allowances at auction.24
These allowances grant a party permission to emit one ton of CO 2fOr
a given period of time.25 Purchasing CO2 allowances is not limited to
power producers; rather, they are available to everyone.26 This
allows environmental groups to buy carbon allowances in order to
remove them completely from the market. 27
Emitters have the ability to offset carbon dioxide emissions by
taking certain actions such as landfill gas capture and combustion,28
afforestation, end use efficiency for natural gas, and methane capture
from farming operations. 29  Offset allowances allow an emitter to
subtract a designated amount of CO 2 emissions from their overall
carbon output.30  Therefore, power producers that emit more than
their permissive amount can bring their levels back into compliance
with offset allowances.3 1 The signatory states allow for a one-to-one
trade for offsets made within a signatory state, thus, if a power utility
creates a carbon offset of one ton, it will be awarded an allowance to
24. See e.g. MASS. GEN. Laws. ch. 21A § 22 (2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REG. tit. 21, §507 (2008).
25. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Model Rules, REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 24 (Dec. 31, 2008), http://vww.rggi.org/docs/
Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.3 1.08.pdf [hereinafter Model Rules]. See
Steven Ferrev, Goblets of Fire: Potentially Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global WYarming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 845 (2008). The auction
allowances are measured against the actual emissions of a site, if the emissions
exceed the allowances the state can take actions to sanction the emitter. Id
26. See Green Group Buys CO 2 Emissions Permit to Retire Them, ENV'T NEWS
SERV. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2009/2009-03-20-
092.html.
27. See id,
28. Landfill gas capture and combustion is a process where methane gas
produced by decomposing organic waste within a landfill is extracted and burned.
Capture and Combustion of Landfill Gas, AUSTRALIAN DEPT. OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/govemient/
initiatives/carbon-farming-initative/methodology-development/methodologies-
under-consideration/capture-combustion-of-landfill-gas/capture-combustion.aspx
(last visited Sep. 28, 2011). The combustion converts the methane to CO 2. Id.
Methane is a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO2, therefore, the conversion
mitigates the negative effects of methane release into the atmosphere. Id.
29. Memorandum of U/nderstanding, supra note 10, at 4.
30. See id at 4-5.
31. See id at 4.
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emit one additional ton of carbon. 32  Offsets created within non-
participating states have a two-to-one ratio, so for every two tons of
carbon offsets a power utility creates outside of a RGGI state, it will
receive a one ton allowance credit.33 If the price of the allowances
increases above $7.00, signatory and non-signatory states will enjoy
the same one-to-one ratio for offsets and allowances.34
The RGGI only applies to those power generators that operate
within the state lines of a signatory state and does not extend to out-
of-state producers that transport energy into an RGGI state.35
Therefore, of considerable concern to RGGI is the phenomenon
called leakage. Leakage occurs when electricity generation shifts
from a source within an RGGI jurisdiction to a state not partaking in
the cap-and-trade system.37 This is partially the result of having only
a regional cap-and-trade system, in which individual states do not
have the power to impose such limitations on other non-willing
states. The MOU addresses leakage only by establishing a
framework from which member states can convene to monitor and
analyze leakage so as to adequately address the issue at a later time. 39
Under RGGI, signatory states must commit at least 25% of the
proceeds from the allowance auctions toward "consumer benefit and
strategic energy purposes." 40 Examples of "consumer benefit and
strategic energy purposes" include mitigating ratepayer impacts,
promoting innovating carbon abatement technologies, or promote
renewable energy technologies. 41 The states have the liberty of
32. See id. at 4-5.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 5.
35. See Margaret Hupp, Note, Congressional Consent Under the Compact
Clause: Plugging the Leaks in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 84 TUL.
L.R. 469, 479 (2009).
36. See Hupp, supra note 35, at 479.
37. See Hupp, supra note 35, at 479; Potential Emissions Leakage and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, at 3
(Mar. 2008), http://www.rggi.org/docs/il report final 3_14_07.pdf [hereinafter
Potential Emissions Leakage].
38. See Potential Emissions Leakage, supra note 37, at 3.
39. See Memorandum of Understanding supra note 10, at 9-10.
40. Id.at 6.
41. Id.
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choosing the proportion of the funds allocated toward this program,
and the benefits that the funds will be used to promote.42
Although the program is largely decentralized, RGGI calls for a
centralized advisory committee called the Regional Organization
43(RO). The RO is a collective entity consisting of selected
representatives from each signatory state.44 The organization's basic
function is to act as a deliberative body, coordinating the creation of
model rules and acting in an advisory capacity as how RGGI should
be administered.4 Additionally, the RO compiles emissions data for
various states and assists them in reviewing various offset
applications.46 The RO, although it appears to be a centralized
agency, explicitly lacks the powers to enforce the program's
provisions. According to the RO's corporate bylaws, the
"exclusive purposes for which the corporation is formed are to
provide technical and scientific advisory services to Signatory
States." 48
The MOU does not create a binding legal agreement; rather, it is a
statement of commitment from the governors of member states.49
Each state retains the ability to withdraw from the agreement upon 30
days' written notice.50  Therefore, the signatory states are not
constrained from unilaterally altering their state's legislative scheme
without approval from the program.f Importantly, if a state does
withdraw from RGGI, the carbon caps established by the agreement
must be reconfigured to avoid jeopardizing the reduction goals of the
program. 52
42. See id.
43. See id. at 7-8.
44. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 7-8.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE Inc.. BY-LAWS, 1 (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://vww.rggi.org/docs/rggi_ bylaws 12 12 07.pdf [hereinafter RGGI By-knes].
49. See Hupp., supra note 35., at 478; Smith, supra note 12, at 404.
50. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 9.
51. See id. at 9.
52. See id.
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b. Implenientation of RGGI by Various States
Despite RGGI's mandate that at least 25% of the funds generated
go toward consumer benefit programs, many states via statute or
regulation have devoted 100% of their RGGI proceeds.5
Massachusetts allocates all of its monies into the RGGI Auction
Trust Fund, which can only be used for specified purposes.54 The
specified purposes include 1) reimbursing municipalities for property
taxes lost as a result of RGGI implementation; 2) funding green
communities;55  3) promoting energy efficiency in non-green
communities; or 4) reimbursing the state for the costs of RGGI
implementation.56 The New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority (NYSERDA) regulations create an Energy
Efficiency and Clean Energy Technology Account to prevent 100%
of the auction proceeds from comingling with other administrative
funds. The Account designates funds to be used to establish energy
53. See e.g. MASS. GEN. Laws. ch. 21A § 22 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
125-0:23 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-50 (West 2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REG. tit. 21, §507 (2008).
54. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 21 A § 22 (2008).
55. A green community is one where a municipality employs a variety of
energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies in an attempt to bring about zero
net energy buildings. About the Green Communities Division, ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/
?pagelD-eoeeaterminal&L=3&LO= Home&L1 Energy%2c+Utilities+%26+Clean
Technologies&L2=Green+Communities&sid=Eoeea&b terminalcontent&f-doer
greencommunities gc-about&csid=Eoeea (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). Zero net
energy is defined as "optimally efficient, and over the course of a year, generates
energy onsite, using clean renewable resources, in a quantity equal to or greater
than the total amount of energy consumed onsite." Zero Net Energy Buildings,
ENERGY AND ENIVTL AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/
?pagel D-eoeeasubtopic&L=4&LO-Home&L 1 Energy%2c+Utilities+%26+C lean
Technologies&L2=Energy+Efficiency& L3 Zero+Net+Energy +Buildings+%28Z
NEB%29&sid=Eoeea (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
56. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 21 A § 22 (2008).
57. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG. tit. 21, §507.4 (2008). New York explicitly
designates what portion of auction proceeds are placed into this account: however,
the regulation's language does not designate any other destination for auction
proceeds other than the "Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy Technology
Account. Id. This implies that New York apportions all funds derived from the
RGGI auctions for the limited uses outlined in section 507.4.
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efficiency, promote renewable technologies, and develop state of the
art emissions abatement technologies.5
New Hampshire's statute similarly appropriates all auction funds
into a greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund, and is much more
instructive as to how to appropriate the funds, suggesting improved
weatherization to promote thermal and electrical efficiency and the
development of useful industrial control systems.59 Ultimately, if the
administrator of the fund finds significant monies unencumbered by
designated proj ects, the administrator "shall refund such
unencumbered dollars to ratepayers in a timely manner. "o New
Jersey, like New Hampshire, allocated all funds produced by the
allowance auctions to the Global Warming Solutions Fund. 61 The
New Jersey scheme detailed how the monies are apportioned: 60% of
the funds are designated for end use energy efficiency, renewable
energy applications, and imovating abatement technologies; 20% for
support programs for low-income residences, especially to reduce the
effects of the program; 10% for energy efficiency and conservation at
the municipal level; and the final 10% for natural resource
redevelopment and conservation. 62
Nowhere in New York's, New Jersey's, or New Hampshire's
statutory schemes are calls for these monies to patch holes in a state's
deficit, nor do they direct that the funds shall be placed in a general
fund to be used at the lawmakers' discretion.63 All three states
appropriate the monies into separate accounts, not to be comingled
with other monies at either the legislative or the regulatory level.64
Yet despite these implementation statutes and RGGI's general
mandate to isolate 25% of the proceeds for consumer benefits and
energy efficiency, states have raided the RGGI funds to cover budget
deficits.65 New Hampshire and New Jersey have requisitioned the
58. See id.
59. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-50 (West 2008).
62. Id. § 26:2C-51 (West 2008).
63. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-50
(West 2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG. tit. 21, §507.4 (2008).
64. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-50
(West 2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG. tit. 21, §507.4 (2008).
65. See Peters, supra note 15; Sanders, supra note 15.
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entirety of their RGGI funds, $3.1 million and $65 million
respectively.66 New York redirected $90 million dollars of its total
Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy Technology Account, roughly
half of the Account's total contents.67
The collective actions of New York, New Hampshire, and New
Jersey create concerns in the environental community, which fears
that RGGI's underlying purpose will be undermined by the a
precedent that state legislatures may siphon these funds whenever
convenient. 68 States' decisions to redirect the RGGI funds toward
budgetary remediation fuel RGGI's opposition, which characterizes
the program as an additional tax on energy producers.69 By placing
the capital generated by the allowance auctions into a general fund to
be used without restriction, RGGI's overall goal of emissions
reduction is tainted by a secondary motive of generating state
- - 70revenue similar to a tax.
Such classifications endanger RGGI, especially in states like New
Hampshire and New Jersey, where recent elections placed anti-RGGI
Republicans in seats of power in legislative and executive offices.7'
In February 2011, the New Hampshire House of Representatives
issued a veto-proof supermajority to repeal the RGGI program, citing
72RGGI as a tax ultimately burdening ratepayers. Governor John
Lynch ultimately vetoed the bill, but did not kill the debate as House
Republicans quickly began working on an improved bill.73 The New
66. See Peters, supra note 15; THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER, supra note 15.
67. See THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER, supra note 15. It should be noted that
New York technically has not gone against the RGGI provisions as stipulated in the
Memorandum of Understanding. See Memorandum of U/nderstanding supra note
10, at 6; MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK, supra note 15.
68. See THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER, supra note 15; Sanders., supra note 15.
69. See Peters, supra note 15; MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK, supra
note 15.
70. See MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING NETWORK, supra note 15; Peters, supra
note 15; Sanders, supra note 15 (quoting a WALL ST. J. editorial criticizing RGGI).
71. See Kevin Landrigan., Future Bleak for NH's Part in Cap-in-Trade,
NASHUA TELEGRAPH (Feb 24, 2011), available http://vww.nashuatelegraph.com/
newsstatenewengland/910067-227/future-bleak-for-nhs-part-in-cap-trade.html;
Navarro, supra note 14.
72. See Landrigan, supra note 71: Navarro, supra note 14.
73. See New Hampshire Governor Vetoes RGGI fWithdrawal Bill., supra note
14.
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Hampshire Senate mitigated concerns over the program's fate by
upholding the veto and deciding to remain in RGGI, choosing instead
to alter it slightly by including a backdoor withdrawal provision.74
The Senate Bill included a provision allowing the state to withdraw
from RGGI upon the withdrawal of another state that produced 10%
or more of the electricity within the programi.
New Hampshire's backdoor provision, although vetoed, creates
considerable questions as to the program's long-term survival,
especially in light of recent developments in New Jersey. There,
Governor Chris Christie unilaterally chose to withdraw New Jersey
from RGGI.76 Governor Christie, in justifying the state's withdrawal,
stated "RGGI does nothing more than tax electricity, tax our citizens,
tax our businesses, with no discernible or measurable impact upon
our environment. Although the New Jersey Senate ultimately
drafted a bill to revive RGGI legislation, the narrow majority was
insufficient to withstand Christie's veto.7 8 It is of particular note that
since New Jersey currently produces over 10% of electricity within
the RGGI system, its withdrawal would clear the way for New
Hampshire to use its backdoor provision and follow suit.79
As written, the RGGI MOU is a non-binding commitment.so There
is no mechanism in place to grant a centralized agency the ability to
seek compliance with the agreement's terms.8' A state is therefore
free to appropriate RGGI funds as it sees fit, regardless of whether it
74. See Nathanael Baker, New Hampshire Senate Votes to Stay in RGGI,
ENERGY BOOM (May 12, 2011), http://www.energyboom.com/policy/new-
hampshire-senate-votes-stay-rggi.
75. Id.
76. Navarro, supra note 14.
77. Id.
78. See Terry Hurlbut, RGGI Revival Passes NJ Assembly, CONSERVATIVE
NEWS AND VIEWS (June 30, 2011), http://wxvww.conservativenewsandviews.com/
2011/06/30/news/ rggi-revival-passes-nj-assemblv/; see also Josh Lederman, Dems
Dy to Stop NAJ Anti-Pollution Pact Pullout, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 14,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9NRMFA0O.htn.
79. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 3.
80. See Smith, supra note 12, at 404.
81. See RGGI By-laws,supra note 48, at 2 (stating that the purpose of the RO is
to provide technical and scientific advisory services).
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conforms to the 25% consumer benefit provision.82 Furthermore, a
state's ability to withdraw from RGGI makes each state's individual
burden dependent upon on other members remaining in the
agreement. 8  New Hampshire's and New Jersey's actions illustrate
the program's precarious position. Their redirection of funds fueled
RGGI's characterization as a tax, ultimately leading to strong support
to repeal it.84 New Jersey's withdrawal from RGGI, when combined
with the New Hampshire House and Senate's apparent agreement to
legislate for a contingent withdrawal option, would ultimately force
other signatory states to alter their current carbon caps to
accommodate these departures.85  Despite this dependence, neither
the signatory states as individuals, nor RGGI as a collective entity
have the ability to seek judicial recourse for these actions.86
III. THE COMPACT CLAUSE
The Compact Clause of the Constitution states: "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement or
Compact with any State . . . ." The ultimate concern presented by
interstate agreements was the fear of "balkanization" of regions in the
United States." If states form blocs within the United States, the
power of the federal government to implement uniform laws and
regulate commerce would be drastically hindered.89 Although the
82. See Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 771, 821 (2010) (elaborating that signatory states retain the
sovereign authority to alter RGGI legislation without approval from other states).
83. See Memorandum of Ui nderstanding supra note 10, at 9 (stipulating that
upon withdrawal of a signatory states need to execute adjustments in usage units).
84. See Landrigan, supra note 71; see also Memorandum of Ui nderstanding.
supra note 10, at 9.
85. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 9.
86. See Craig, supra note 82, at 821 (discussing the states individual power to
alter RGGI legislation unilaterally); RGGI By-lans, supra note 48, at 1-2 (limiting
the power of the RO to seek compliance with the RGGI).
87. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
88. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd of Fed. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).
89. See id. at 174 (stating the Framers' fears over regional confederations
controlling economic actions in the early union).
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language of the clause appears to apply to any and all instances in
which two or more states might enter into an agreement, the Supreme
Court has interpreted it to only apply to certain limited instances. 90
In Virginia v. Tennessee, Justice Field articulated the prevailing
analysis when an interstate compact requires the consent of
Congress.91 An agreement demands congressional approval when it
tends to "increase of political power in the states, which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States." 92
The Court expanded this doctrine in United States Steel
Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission.93 Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, articulated three factors to consider when analyzing
these agreements: 1) whether a third party organization was formed
to oversee and enforce compliance between the states, 2) whether the
agreement expands upon the nonnal political powers enjoyed by
states, and 3) whether the state retains the ability to modify or repeal
legislation enacting the agreement's terms. 94  The second factor
would include instances when a state, through agreement, attempts to
90. See Virginia v. Tennessee. 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (limiting the scope of
the Compact Clause).
91. See Virginia v. Tennessee., 148 U.S. at 519: see also U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1976).
92. Virginia v. Tennessee., 148 U.S. at 519. There is no magic as to what
qualifies as an agreement or compact., the court in Virginia stated that the language
was left particularly broad to cover both formal and informal agreements. Id. at
517-518. Therefore, the clause can be triggered so long as there is some covenant
to engage in a united effort, regardless of whether it is legally binding between the
parties. See id. at 517-18. The determination often centers on whether the compact
potentially extends this paper, and not on whether there has been an actual
expansion on the state's sovereign powers. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm 'n, 434 U.S. at 472.
93. 434 U.S. at 472-73.
94. See id. at 472-73. All agreements that create third party organizations do
not necessarily create Compact Clause issues. See id. at 472-73. In U.S. Steel, the
agreement in question created an independent organization whose purpose was to
advise on the proper implementation for taxation of multistate business entities. Id.
at 456. The agency had no enforcement powers., and only recommended
amendments to laws thereby requiring the state to implement those
recommendations. Id. The court found this provision did not go against the
Multistate Tax Commission in requiring consent. Id. at 472-73.
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reach out beyond its geographic borders and exert its powers on other
sovereign states.95 This can include acting in a capacity reserved to
Congress under the Constitution through either the Supremacy
Clause or the Commerce Clause. 96
As a measure of safety, the common practice is to seek
Congressional consent, because once an agreement is approved it
becomes federal law. 97 There are certain benefits that come with an
interstate compact becoming federal law. Once Congress consents to
an agreement it acts as if Congress was the force legislating on the
issue.98 Therefore, an agreement which might be found to unduly
burden interstate commerce so as to threaten invalidation under the
Donnant Commerce Clause could be acceptable, as Congress is
constitutionally vested with the ability to regulate interstate
commerce. 99  Secondly, as the interstate compact would be
transformed into federal law upon approval, there would be no
Supremacy Clause issue.100 Along with curing some of the
constitutional defects through consent, an added benefit is the
indication that Congress did not intend to exert exclusive control in a
certain area.'01 In De Veau v. Braistad, the Court stated that adoption
of an interstate compact could demonstrate for non-compact states
that the federal intent was not to exert exclusive control over a certain
95. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 472-73
(outlining factors indicating whether Congressional Consent is needed).
96. See id. at 473-76 (determining whether the Multistate Tax Commission
encroaches on issues of federal supremacy of the Commerce Clause). The most
pressing question is usually whether the state could within its own sovereign
powers take the actions under the compact. See id. at 472-73.
97. See Cuvler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (finding federal question
jurisdiction due to Congressional Consent making the compact federal law).
98. See Craig, supra note 82, at 827-28 (discussing the various benefits to
obtaining Congressional Consent).
99. See id. at 828-29 (elaborating on the benefits of achieving consent under the
commerce clause).
100. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440 (stating that approval transforms the compact
into federal law); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (restricting the state's ability to act in
contradiction of the federal government in acting within lawful authority).
101. See DeVeau v. Braistad, 363 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1960); see also Craig, supra
note 82, at 828.
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body, thereby allowing other states to engage in similar accords
without fear of the Supremacy Clause.102
Congress does not need to give express consent. In Virginia v.
Tennessee, the court reviewed a long-standing agreement that would
adjust and solidify the border between the two states.' 03 Although
Congress had not explicitly deliberated on the agreement, the court
found that Congress respected the boundary line when drawing
electoral districts, thereby providing implicit consent.104
Additionally, consent could be given in advance, such as when
Congress passes legislation to empower a state to enter such
compacts. 05 For example, in Cuyler v. Adams an agreement between
Pennsylvania and New Jersey pertaining to the extradition of
prisoners was challenged as an invalid interstate compact.106 The
Court upheld the agreement on the ground that before the states
contracted, Congress explicitly sanctioned the agreement under the
Crime Control Consent Act.' 07 The pertinent statute granted blanket
approval of "any two or more States . .. in the prevention of crime
and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and
policies . . . ."108 So long as Congress consents through one of the
above-mentioned mechanisms, the interstate compact is
constitutional under the Compact Clause. 109
102. See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 152-54. Additionally if federal approval is given,
and the agreements provisions become federal law, a signatory state would be
unable to pass a law contradictory to those provisions on the grounds that any
conflicting state legislation would be preempted under the Supremacy Clause. See
Mineo v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 779 F.2d 939, 948 (3d Cir. 1985).
103. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 524-25 (1893) (finding implicit
congressional consent).
104. See id.
105. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 441.
106. Id. at 436-38 (reciting the facts of Cuyler).
107. See id. at 441-42.
108. Id. at 441.
109. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (requiring consent of Congress); Cuyler,
449 U.S. at 441-42 (holding Congress granted consent through encouraging states
to pass like agreements); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 524-25 (holding
Congress granted implied approval through acquiescence of the agreement).
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IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Of particular importance in the discussion of RGGI's constitutional
issues under the Compact Clause are the Constitution's Commerce
Clause110 and the Supremacy Clause. II Both clauses involve
instances in which Congress may act and when the state cannot.
Because the test for needing congressional consent falls on the
agreement expanding the normal boundaries of state power, a brief
analysis of these articles in light of energy generation is relevant.
a. The Commerce Clause
The Congress of the United States has the ability "to regulate
commerce... among the several states."11 2  The modern trend has
been to interpret this power broadly. 113 As recently as 1995, the
Supreme Court has upheld the Congress' ability to regulate a wide
variety of activities, including the channels of interstate commerce,
the instrumentalities of interstate cormnerce, people and things in
interstate commerce, as well as those activities that have a substantial
affect on interstate commerce.114 Courts view energy as archetypal
articles in interstate commerce," thus, it is Congress' prerogative to
regulate energy as an article of commerce.' 16
110. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
111. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
112. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8. cl. 3.
113. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005) (upholding Congress' ban
on marijuana grown and used solely intrastate due to the potential effect on the
national market). This case upholds the broad Commerce Clause powers
established in Wfickard v. Filburn, which found allowed Congressional legislation
over agricultural actions grown and sold entirely intrastate as such activities might
discourage national regulatory efforts of goods sold interstate. 317 U.S. 111. 118-
19, 127-28 (1942).
114. See United States v. Lopez., 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (holding Congress
did not have a rational basis to ban firearms in local schools under the Commerce
Clause). Although Lopez reigned back Congress' extensive powers under the
Commerce Clause, Gonzales has injected a level of uncertainty into when an
activity creates a "substantial effect". See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; Gonzales,
545 U.S. at 25-26.
115. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
116. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-54; FERC, 456 U.S. at 757.
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A corollary doctrine to Congress' ability to regulate interstate
commerce is the Dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition of states
to burden interstate commerce. 1 7 At the heart of this doctrine is the
need to prohibit economic protectionism states may exert to favor in-
state businesses.' 18 A state can violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause in two ways. The first is by discriminating against the
importation or exportation of an article in cormnerce based upon a
geographical distinction.1 9 When a state statute facially
discriminates based on the point of origin of a good, the reviewing
court applies strict scrutiny and will consider it per se invalid under
the Dormant Commerce Clause.120  The court can also apply this
strict scrutiny standard when a state restricts a good from leaving that
state. 121
117. See City of Philadelphia. v. New Jersey., 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
118. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
119. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624-25. An important
distinction needs to be made when there is economic favoritism being exerted by
the state when the state is acting in the capacity of a market participant. Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10 (1976). When the state creates the
market for a good., the Supreme Court stated that the state is free to demonstrate
favoritism for goods produced in that state. See id. at 809-10.
120. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624. A state which
grants tax benefits for in-state producers of an article, only to extend such benefits
to out-of-state producers upon that other state creating reciprocal tax benefits has
been deemed to be faciallv discriminatory. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 274. In New
Energy the Supreme Court found that an Ohio statute granting a tax benefit only for
intrastate produced ethanol and ethanol produced in states granting ethanol
producers similar benefits was facially discriminatory. Id Under strict scrutiny,
the court declined finding that there was a necessary purpose to survive the per se
invalidity, as the primary purpose was revenue generation and not environmental
protection. Id. at 278-80. The characteristic of the program as a tax was a fatal
determination by the court. Id. at 275.
121. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire., 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
New England Power involved New Hampshire allowing the public utilities
commission to restrict the flow of electricity of power generated in New Hampshire
from leaving the state, in order to benefit the individuals citizens to the harm of
out-of-state citizens. Id. at 339. The court held that such activities were the precise
protectionist initiatives prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at
339.
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The second way a state can violate the doctrine is through enacting
- * 122
legislation that creates an undue burden on interstate commerce.
This standard is applied when the statute in question which is
reserved for laws "directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects
upon interstate commerce that are only incidental."123 When this
standard is triggered, courts are much more lenient and implement
the Pike Balancing Test to determine whether the benefits and
interests of the state in enacting the legislation outweigh the burden it
poses to interstate commerce.124
Using the Pike Balancing Test, a court will uphold a
nondiscriminatory statute unless the "burden imposed on [interstate
cormnerce] is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."12 5  The first step is to identify the incidental burden on
interstate commerce, which requires a showing that there is a heavier
122. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471
(1981); Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 804.
123. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at
624); see also Clover LeafCreamery Co., 449 U.S. at 471.
124. See, e.g., United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346; Clover Leaf Creamery Co.. 449
U.S. at 471; Alexandria Scrap., 426 U.S. at 804. Those interests usually in the
purview of the states are the "health, safety, and welfare of citizens" as well as
promotion of environmental health. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342, 346-47.
One interest that is not tolerated is the protection of a dying industry. See West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 197 (1994). There the statute in
question levied a tax on all dairy dealers to pay into a "Massachusetts Dairy
Equalization Fund." Id. at 190-91. This fund was then paid out to intrastate dairy
farms for the purpose of subsidizing their production. Id. at 205. Although the two
actions individually would be sanctioned under the Commerce Clause, the
combination of the actions was deemed to be an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. Id. at 199.
125. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). In United Haulers, the Supreme Court was faced with a
local initiative, which required all trash in that locality to be brought to a special
processing facility, and pay fees directly to the town for the use of that facility. Id.
at 336-37. The Court held that the statute in question passed the Pike Balancing
Test because the "rather abstract harm" that would exist. Id. at 346. The Court
found that the benefits the state's interests exceeded any harm to interstate
commerce because the initiative had the effect of generating necessary revenues
and promoted both environmental health concerns. Id. at 346-47.
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burden on out of state interests than in state interests.1 26 The second
step is to ascertain what the state's interest is.12 7 The Supreme Court
holds that the conservation of natural resources and reduction of solid
waste were legitimate state interests. 128  The Pike Balancing Test
does not outlaw all unequal burdens on out of state interests: it only
prohibits burdens that are clearly excessive when compared with the
substantial local interest of the state.129
b. Federal Preemption under the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states: "the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land."1 30 The concept of federal preemption
prevents a state from enacting legislation contradictory to legitimate
federal laws.13 There are three types of preemption: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.132 Field
preemption occurs when Congress has enacted a scheme that is "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room to supplement it."133 This can occur where the federal interest
is so dominant that courts assume that state enforcement will be
126. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 472-73. Clover Leaf centered
on a Minnesota law, which required all suppliers in the state to sell only milk
contained in paperboard cartons and not in non-returnable plastic containers. Id. at
458-59. The Supreme Court upheld the law stating that the burdens imposed by
the statute effected in- and out-of-state interests equally, and any minor burden was
insufficient to override the state's interest in conserving natural resources and
promoting health. Id. at 472-74.
127. See id. at 473.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 473-74.
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
131. See id.
132. Express preemption involves Congress explicitly stating that a certain
statute overrides all state initiatives of a similar nature. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987). Conflict preemption applies
when there has not been an express preemption but the state law either is
contradictory to the federal law or undermines the federal regime. See Int'l Paper,
479 U.S. at 492.
133. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sax. & Loan
Assn'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982)).
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precluded on that same subject.13 4 However, in analyzing whether a
state law is susceptible under field preemption, courts will take the
claimed purpose of the state action at face value.135 Although courts
employ a presumption of constitutionality when considering
preemption of a state law, when a state law enters into a field where
federal authority is exclusive, the presumption favors preemption.136
Congress demonstrated its intent to exercise exclusive authority in
the realm of pricing of power in interstate commerce through the
Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) and the Natural Gas Act of
1938.' 7 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was
established to implement the Federal Power Act's mandate of
regulating "public utilities for the benefit of consumers" by
establishing rates for the interstate transmission and sale of
electricity. 138 As the national interest in energy purveyance is the
focal interest of FERC, the FPA only has jurisdiction when the
electricity is or has the potential to be distributed in interstate
commerce.139 This jurisdiction therefore is particularly broad, as it
would govern sales of power from a generator to an in-state retailer if
the power is to be subsequently consumed in another state.140
134. See id.
135. See id. at 216 (declining the investigate into the true motive of California in
placing a moratorium in the creation of nuclear power plants). Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co.involved interpreting whether a California moratorium on the production of
nuclear power facilities until better disposal technology was created and adopted
was federally preempted. Id. at 197-200. The court held that although the Atomic
Energy Act demonstrates Congress' exclusive intent to regulate the safety involved
in nuclear energy production, the California moratorium was not involved in the
field of safety but rather was motivated by economic considerations and did not
enter the realm of Congress' exclusive authority. Id at 210-16.
136. See id. at 203-04.
137. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1964)
138. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cnty Wash. v. FERC., 471 F.3d 1053,
1057-58 (9th Cir. 2006). This does not apply to the setting of rates which
consumers are charged by local utilities. See id. at 1058. FERC therefore acts
indirectly to protect consumers by determining the fair rates of electricity sold
between generators and retailers. See id.
139. See Ferrey, supra note 25, at 890-91.
140. See id. at 892.
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The FPA's regulatory scheme works through FERC's interaction
with private contracts between purveyors and retailers of energy.
The utility company sets the rates, which under Title 16 section 824d
must be "just and reasonable."142 FERC investigates these rates and
can require modification if they do not conform to the statutory
standard that the utility company must then file the new rate with
FERC.143 Once FERC approves a rate, a state cannot directly or
indirectly alter those rates through state regulation.144  Therefore,
states cannot interfere with FERC-approved rates as a matter of
preemption.145 Courts have upheld this doctrine when states attempt
to promote higher prices for renewable energy producers, thereby
prohibiting states from interfering with FERC-approved pricing
schemes regardless of their interests.146
V. DOES RGGI REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT?
As it stands without congressional consent, RGGI may be on shaky
constitutional ground. The agreement does not seem to have the
classic indices of an interstate compact that would require
congressional consent as outlined in U.S. Steel. Nevertheless, RGGI
may contain elements of facial discrimination and undue burdens on
interstate commerce that raise serious issue under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. RGGI also creates issues under the Supremacy
Clause as it may intrude on FERC's exclusive authority to determine
the "just and reasonable" electricity rates.147
RGGI is non-binding and as such is atypical of traditional contracts
or agreements.148 However, as the court stated in Virginia v.
Tennessee, an agreement need not be formal in order to fall under the
gaze of the Compact Clause.149 The dispositive inquiry under the
141. See Snohomish County, 471 F.3d at 1058.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Ser. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003).
145. See id.
146. See Ferrey, supra note 25, at 895 (citing Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v.
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994)).
147. Ferrey, supra note 25, at 890.
148. See Smith, supra note 12, at 404.
149. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1893).
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Compact Clause concerns not the form of the agreement, but rather
the effect it will have on the federal sphere.' 50  Although RGGI
purports to be non-binding, it is still subject to the Compact Clause
because it presents a unified agreement among several states to
establish a complementary system for addressing greenhouse
gases. Therefore, RGGI's non-binding nature will not save it from
constitutional review.152  The central issue is whether RGGI
"increase[s] ... political power in the states, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States."153
US. Steel provides a practical guide for testing whether an
agreement among states requires Congressional consent.'54 The test
uses three indicators to determine when states increase their political
power so as to inv ade the federal sphere.' 55 RGGI is analogous to the
Multistate Tax Commission in that it creates a third party
organization, but the RO would not hurt the agreement's
constitutionality.156 Similar to the Multistate Tax Commission, the
RO has only advisory and monitoring capabilities. '5 Its sole
purposes are to aid states in enacting legislation that follows the
RGGI guidelines and to provide suggestions for addressing future
issues like leakage.'58 What is missing from the RO's capabilities is
the power to enforce compliance or seek judicial recourse from the
150. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472 (1976).
151. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 517-18 (observing the
comprehensive definition of agreement and compact under the Constitution to
cover such agreements). Although it could be argued that RGGI is more like
Bancorp., where the alleged agreement was only passage of reciprocal statutes,
RGGI is different in that in addition to passing reciprocal statutes the states are
uniting to address a specific purpose., and creating a market for the sale of
allowances to the express exclusion of non-participating states. See Ne. Bancorp,
Inc. v. Bd of Fed. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159. 175-76
(1985). Therefore there is a mutuality of assent present in RGGI that was missing
from the Bancorp situation. See id.
152. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 517-18.
153. See id. at 519.
154. See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 472-73.
155. See id. For a detailed explanation of the three-factor test, see supra page 12.
156. Compare Memorandum of U/nderstanding, supra note 4, at 7, 9, with U.S.
Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 456.
157. See RGGI Inc., By-Lan4s, supra note 48, at 4.
158. Id.
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signatory states. This limitation does not support a finding that the
states have stepped beyond their normal means and entered into a
realm reserved for federal power.1 9
Another influential factor is RGGI's non-binding nature. As it
stands, RGGI has no means of seeking compliance, leaving the states
free to repeal or modify their statutes. 160 This indicates that signatory
states have not extended their political influence to infringe upon the
sovereign powers of participants.161 States maintain their freedom to
alter their legislation, and as a corollary preserve their limited powers
in not controlling the normal political processes in other RGGI
states. 162
Although the first two factors of US. Steel do not indicate a
constitutional vulnerability in RGGI for failure to obtain
congressional consent, the third factor, expansion of the state's
political power, does indicate such a weakness. RGGI expands
signatory states' power into areas traditionally reserved to Congress.
The agreement encourages states to both create potentially facially
discriminatory legislation, and at the same time burden interstate
commerce. Additionally, RGGI may trespass into an area where
Congress has demonstrated intent to exercise exclusive interstate
commerce power, thereby triggering concerns under the Supremacy
Clause.
SHOULD RGGI BE "SCRAP"-ED? THE APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
RGGI is meant to increase the costs of power production within a
participant's borders in order to create incentives for producers to
exercise better carbon emissions controls.'6 3  However, these
- - 164increases in production costs ultimately pass onto consumers.
159. See U.S. Steel Corp.. 434 U.S. at. 472-73 (1976); see also Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
160. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 9.
161. See generally, U.S. Steel Corp. 434 U.S. at 472-73.
162. See Memorandum of U1nderstanding. supra note 10, at 9 (allowing states the
freedom to modify or repeal RGGI legislation).
163. See id. at 1.
164. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cnty Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d
1053, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating the reason for the FPA is to create an
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Electricity consumers affected would not be located solely within the
borders of signatory states. Yet, the mitigation benefits and
privileges RGGI offers are only geared toward intrastate activities.165
These provisions create significant concerns under the commerce
clause both in terms of facial discrimination and the Pike Balancing
Test.
When a statute is facially discriminatory based on the article's
point of origin it is considered "per se invalid," and therefore if
RGGI's provisions are centered on a point of origin, it will run afoul
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.' 66 One potential challenge could
come from RGGI's limitation on out-of-state offsets. Under RGGI,
offsets generated within a participating state enjoy a one-to-one ratio
for allowance credits, while out-of-state offsets garner only half the
number of allowance credits.' 67 Ultimately, the offset provisions in
RGGI base the value of offsets on a point of origin determination.168
The rationale for this distinction likely centers on a desire to reward
those activities emitters take in signatory states to benefit the local
enviromnent.169
This structure creates an incentive for emitters to generate offsets
within signatory states at the exclusion of non-signatories. In City
of Philadelphia v. New, Jersey, the Supreme Court recognized a
balance between a state attempting to engage in economic
protectionism and its legitimate exercise of protecting the health and
indirect restraint on the allocation of costs on consumers). This is subject to the
rate increases imposed on retailers being approved by FERC. See id.
165. See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008) (establishing the
programs auction proceeds will be spent on); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-51 (West
2008) (allocating allowance auction resources).
166. See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(holding that geographically discriminatory legislation is de facto invalid).
167. See Memorandum of Understanding. supra note 10, at 4-5.
168. See id. (distinguishing between in state offsets and out-of-state offsets).
169. See id. at 4-5 (allowing for an exchange of a one ton allowance for offsets
reducing carbon dioxide by one ton for in signatory states, and a one allowance to
two ton offset exchange outside a signatory state).
170. See id. at 4-5 (creating a better benefits for offsets taken within participating
states).
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safety of its citizens. There, New Jersey prohibited the importation
of out-of-state waste for disposal in New Jersey landfills.' 72  The
Court held that the statute was passed with the intent to conserve the
ever-shrinking landfill space for the sole benefit of New Jersey
citizens.' 7 3 The offset restrictions demonstrate a similar protectionist
motive to incentivize beneficial actions within signatory states'
borders to the exclusion of non-signatory states. 174
However, the particular focus of RGGI's protectionism may save
it. Dornant Commerce Clause cases invalidate state actions when
they are economically protectionist.'7 5  RGGI's offset provision is
geared more toward benefitting the environment of signatory states
over that of non-signatories - in other words, it could be argued that
RGGI's discrimination is not demonstrably economic.176 Offsets are
not transferable, and can only be redeemed for emission allowances
under the RGGI program. This makes offsets different from
traditional articles of interstate commerce in that they do not flow
through the market in the same way as commercial goods.'7 ' RGGI
does not restrict interstate commerce through geographical
discrimination because offset allowances would not be of interest to
non-signatory states.179 Because offsets are arguably not economic
instruments, RGGI may merely be supporting a form of
environmental, not economic, protectionism.'8 0
171. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey., 437 U.S. at 624-25 (stating the
rationale behind the Dormant Commerce Clause).
172. See id. at 628.
173. See id.
174. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
175. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1994).
176. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
177. See id.
178. See United States v. Lopez., 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (establishing the
various means Congress can regulate interstate commerce); see also City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 622-23 (providing framework for
definition of articles in interstate commerce).
179. See U.S. CONST. art 1, §8, cl. 3 (triggering constitutional limits only in
instances in which commerce is involved).
180. See Memorandum of Understanding. supra note 10, at 1-2, 4-5 (establishing
the intent to promote environmentally friendly and efficient technologies through
the initiative).
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Wh1at harms this conclusion is the fact that RGGI does in fact offer
economic benefits based on activities occurring within signatory
states. 8 Although offsets are not themselves articles in commerce,
the power generators who inject electricity into interstate commerce
are ultimately harmed based on their geographic location. 182 This
fact alone does not condenmn RGGI as unconstitutional, since such
carbon offsets are only available for redemption within signatory
states. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, Maryland instituted a
program where the state would buy discarded automobiles from both
in- and out-of-state tow companies.184 Before accepting the junked
car, the state required in-state wreckers to produce an agreement
indemnifying the state or wrongdoing; for out-of-state wreckers the
requirement was proof of title, a much more onerous burden on the
wrecking companies. 8 5  The Supreme Court upheld the facially
discriminatory statute, holding that when states do not act as
regulators, but as market participants, they are free to favor activities
that benefit themselves at the exclusion of other states.' 86 The entire
market for exchanging carbon offsets for emissions allowances
centers on the participation of RGGI states. Peculiar to this
scenario is that signatory states hold a dual role: they act as regulators
through imposing requirements for utility companies to purchase
allowances, and simultaneously create a market for power generators
to exchange offsets for allowance credits.'88  This puts RGGI on a
more dubious footing than the challenged statute in Alexandria
181. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5 (devaluing out-
of-state offsets).
182. See id. (limiting the benefits offered under RGGI based on status of states as
participating in RGGI).
183. See id. (allowing for the use of offsets to obtain allowance credits).
184. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.. 426 U.S. 794, 800-01 (1976).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 808-10 (holding Maryland did not facially discriminate due to its
status as a market participant).
187. See Memorandum of Understanding. supra note 10, at 4-5.
188. Model Rules, supra note 25, at 23 (implementing sanctions for failure to
have sufficient allowances).
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Scrap, and its double identity may bring the strict scrutiny of the
facial discrimination analysis to bear on its offset provisions.
The program is also vulnerable because it may increase the price of
energy for out-of-state consumers. RGGI requires emitters to
purchase greenhouse gas emissions credits, adding an extra cost to
electricity production and potentially increasing rates.190 Consumers
in both participating and non-participating states will feel this
increase.191 The difference between the rate increases felt by in- state
and out-of-state consumers, however, lies in RGGI's consumer
benefit scheme, which states can use to "directly mitigate electricity
ratepayer impacts." 192 New Hampshire implemented its consumer
benefits by funding weatherization initiatives and subsidies for low-
income energy consumers.'93 Along with funding similar efficiency
initiatives, New Jersey refunded some of its proceeds directly back to
consumers to defray rate increases.194 In neither instance were
affected out-of-state consumers reimbursed for the increase in
electricity prices. 95
In New~ England Pow er, a statute intended to benefit in-state
citizens at the expense of out-of-state consumers was deemed per se
illegal.196  New Hampshire restricted the exportation of power
generated within the state, which the Supreme Court found to be the
exact type of protectionist measure the Constitution intended to
189. Compare Model Rules, supra note 25, at 23 (implementing sanctions for
failure to have sufficient allowances) with Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809-10.
190. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008): see also Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 10, at 6. Although RGGI predicts that certain
"ratepayer impacts" will gradually present themselves, average users are usually
federal shielded from excessive increases through the Federal Power Act's
oversight of contracts between power generators and wholesalers. See Pub. Util.
Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cnty Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir.
2006); Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
191. See Ferrey, supra note 25, at 892.
192. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
193. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008).
194. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-51 (West 2008).
195. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-51
(West 2008).
196. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire., 455 U.S. 331, 339-40
(1982).
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prohibit. 197 As implemented, RGGI envisions increases to electricity
costs for both in- and out-of-state consumers, while its benefit
programs reimburse only in-state consumers.198 This appears to be
similar to the scheme of protectionism that the Court outlawed in
New England Power.199 Missing, though, is the same type of states'
direct action. Neiw England Power involved a state's explicit attempt
to restrict the flow of electricity and generate benefits flowing
directly from such restriction. 200 No RGGI provisions restrict the
flow of power from the state. Consumers in signatory and non-
signatory states alike bear the costs, and it is up to the states to
reimburse their own citizens for those increases.20 1 It is therefore
questionable whether this scheme would succeed under the holding
of New, England Power.202
Although RGGI may not be facially discriminatory, its effects on
electricity markets may be an unjustifiable burden on interstate
commerce and therefore invalid under the Pike Balancing Test.20 3
The burdens in this instance include increased costs of generating
units of electricity and the energy producers' inability to alter the
197. See id.
198. See Memorandum of Understanding supra note 10, at 4-5 (repaying
ratepayers for any increase in power caused by RGGI).
199. Compare New England Power, 455 U.S. at 335-36 with Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
200. See New England Power, 455 U.S. at 335-36.
201. See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2C-51 (West 2008).
202. See New England Power, 455 U.S. at 335-36. These schemes would not
likely be invalidated under West Lynn Creamery as the scheme is not meant to
create a more hospitable environment for certain businesses against out of state
competitors. See 512 U.S. 186, 205. Unlike WYest Lynn Creamery, the subsidies in
these states are used to reimburse in state commerce, not dying industries.
Compare WYest Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 190-91 with Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 10, at 4-5.
203. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007); Minnesota. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 471 (1981); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.. 426 U.S. 794, 804
(1976).
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price of such units without the FERC's consent.204 These burdens
may damage power generators' financial ability to produce quantities
of energy that would potentially reach the interstate market, thereby
creating an advantageous situation for purveyors in non-signatory
states.205 Additionally, as the RGGI consumer benefit provisions
demonstrate, these allowance costs may factor into the calculation of
a "just and reasonable" price for energy. 206 This would allow power
producers in signatory states to increase wholesale energy prices,
which will ultimately be borne by both in- state and out-of-state
consumers. 207 Out-of-state consumers will face a higher burden due
to the absence of the allowance-auction funded state trusts in RGGI
signatories. 208 This burden is minimal, as power generated outside
the signatory states would not be hindered by the RGGI cap-and-
trade program and rate increases would be contained to RGGI states
and immediately adjacent locales. By adding incentives for
generators to utilize carbon reduction technology while
simultaneously funding green initiatives, RGGI's benefits likely
outweighs its costs;209 climate change stands to cause trillions of
dollars in damage for East Coast states alone.210 As such, RGGI
likely passes the Pike Balancing Test.
VI. RGGI v. FERC: A BATTLE OF THE ACRONYMS
A state need not unduly burden interstate commerce to
impermissibly extend its political powers and trigger the Compact
204. See Memorandum of Understanding. supra note 10, at 1 (stating the purpose
as to provide incentives for energy providers to alter their present business
practices).
205. See West Lynn Creamery., 512 U.S. at 199 (stating a variety of reasons for
imposing certain burdens on interstate commerce).
206. Memorandum of U1nderstanding, supra note 10, at 6.
207. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co.. 449 U.S. at 471-74.
208. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:23 (2008); Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 10, at 6.
209. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 1-2.
210. See Dinardo, supra note 4.
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Clause. 211 For RGGI, the principle of field preemption is particularly
relevant. As stated above, the FPA grants the FERC exclusive
authority to determine what electricity prices are "just and
reasonable."212 Courts have interpreted this broad expression of
authority to preempt any state action that may touch upon this field of
federal jurisdiction.213 In its present form, the RGGI cap-and-trade
system may impermissibly insert signatory states into a field
Congress may have intended to be exclusive to FERC.214
RGGI's aim is to increase the cost of production for power
generators by no longer granting facilities the ability to emit
greenhouse gases for free.215 RGGI envisions that this will
incentivize power producers to utilize more efficient carbon
reduction technology, thereby decreasing a demand for
allowances.216 Under the filed rate doctrine, the rates submitted to
and approved by FERC have pre-emptive effect over state actions
that attempt to alter the wholesale market cost of energy transported
in interstate commerce. 2 17  RGGI, by requiring generators to
purchase emissions allowances, creates an added cost to electricity,
perhaps entering into an area that Congress has intended to occupy
exclusively. 2 18 This creates significant concerns for the program's
ability to survive a Supremacy Clause challenge.
The states' express rationale for implementing RGGI does not
provide it a safe haven. In PG & E, the Supreme Court held that it
would accept a state's rationale for adoption of a statute at face value
211. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1976) (stating the various ways a state could expand its political power through an
interstate compact).
212. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cnty Wash. v. FERC., 471 F.3d 1053.
1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (elaborating on how the FPA operates).
213. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Ser. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003)
(upholding the filed-rate doctrine).
214. See id. at 47-48 (explaining the filed rate doctrine).
215. See Memorandum of Understanding supra note 10, at 1-2.
216. See id.
217. See Entery., 539 U.S. at 47 (holding that a state cannot interfere with the
tariffs approved by FERC by implementing additional costs).
218. See id.; Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cntv Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d
1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006).
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without a deep inquiry into its unstated motives. 219 If RGGI had a
stated rationale other than to increase the wholesale price of power in
interstate commerce, it could possibly survive an attack based on
field preemption. 220 However, the drafters of the program's MOU
did not limit their purpose to becoming "world leaders in the ...
deployment of carbon emission control technology" or to reducing
dependence on fossil fuels.221 The MOU explicitly states a desire to
create a carbon restraint system that incentivizes the use of carbon
control technologies and decrease sources of carbon emissions. 222
Hence, the system desires to burden the generation of electricity as a
form of economic pressure to drive down carbon emissions.223 This
removes PG & E as a viable defense to a preemption challenge,
leaving RGGI with a long line of precedent that casts its
constitutionality into doubt.
VII. CARBON AND STEEL: RGGI's STATUS AS AN INTERSTATE
COMPACT
RGGI, because it permits its signatory states to retain the ability to
modify and repeal enacting legislation and lacks a third-party
enforcement organ, appears to be constructed similar to the
Multistate Tax Commission challenged in US. Steel. Yet despite
RGGI being non-binding and without a third party organization
capable of enforcing compliance, the susceptibility of the program
under the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause may demonstrate
that participating states have exceeded their normally enjoyed
powers. RGGI's potentially discriminatory offset provisions and
consumer benefit programs may also trigger the Dormant Commerce
Clause.224 Additionally, the program's objective to interfere with
pricing schemes between electricity generators and wholesalers likely
219. See Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 216.
220. See id. (holding that the court will accept at face value the stated purpose for
legislation).
221. Memorandum of Ui nderstanding supra note 10, at 1-2 (stating the purpose
of RGGI).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See supra Part IVa.
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intrudes into FERC's exclusive pricing authority under the FPA.
These serious constitutional issues may be fatal to RGGI unless it can
secure congressional consent.
a. Seeking Big Brother's Approval: Issues of Consent under the
Compact Clause
Under the Compact Clause, an agreement found to intrude on the
powers of the federal government can only be valid with a grant of
congressional consent.225 As stated above, it is highly likely that
RGGI has crossed the line into areas traditionally reserved for the
226federal g overmnent.26 In addition, RGGI is noticeably lacking in
explicit congressional consent. A bill in Congress seeking federal
ratification of the agreement could rectify its various constitutional
- * 227-deficiencies: however, approval is not a certainty. Ratification
may depend on the political climate present upon such a bill's
submission.228 In 1955, Congress failed to ratify the California-
Nevada Interstate Compact due to strong opposition from Native
American tribes.229  Congress demonstrated a similar reluctance
when it refused to ratify the Truckee River Compact in 1994 due to
concerns of state interference with a federal water regulatory
-230
regime.
A similar opposition could be expected against a regional cap-and-
trade program. The popularity of cap-and-trade is in steep decline in
225. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3: Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503. 519
(1893).
226. See supra Part IVa.
227. See Bonnie G. Colby, et. al., Mitigating Environmental Externalities
Through Voluntary and Involuntary Water Reallocation: Nevada's Truckee-Carson
River Basin, 31 NAT. RES. J. 757, 773 (providing guidelines for when Congress has
previously denied approval for an interstate compact).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Erik Davis, Interstate Compacts That Are For the Birds: A Proposal for
Reconciling Federal W1etlands Protection with State Water Rights Through
Federal-Interstate Compacts, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 325, 350 (1996) (discussing the
failure of Congress to pass an interstate compact). But see Smith, supra note 6, at
329 (stating that when an interstate compact is presented to Congress, approval is
usually "automatic").
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Washington.231 In 2009, the Waxman-Markey Bill, also known as
the American Clean Energy and Security Act, was defeated in the
Senate despite passing the House.232 Since that time, the capital has
become a less hospitable enviromnent for climate change legislation;
recently elected Tea Party members often characterize these
initiatives as a "cap and tax."233 In April 2011, Congress rejected an
amendment that would have recognized EPA's findings of climate
234
change's existence. Such opposition creates significant skepticism
regarding the viability of any approval measure RGGI may take.235
Charged statements like those of the "Americans for Prosperity,"
which calls RGGI a tax, likely reflect similar sentiments in a
Republican House.236 The potential burdens that the program places
on energy generation and the ancillary effects on out-of-state
consumers only strengthen RGGI's opposition.2 37 Ultimately, it is
doubtful that motion for approval would survive on the floor of the
Capitol.
There is an inverse to this argument: the failures of a federal cap-
and-trade program may indicate a desire to leave such determinations
to the states. 238 The large Republican opposition to climate change
legislation may be premised in part on a larger hostility toward big
governent and a federal environmental scheme.239 In March 2011,
Republican Congressman Fred Upton introduced the Energy Tax
231. See John M. Broder, 'Cap-and-trade' Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy
of Choice, NY TIMES . Mar. 25., 2010, at A13 (chronicling the history of cap-and-
trade).
232. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
233. See Broder, supra note 231.
234. See James M. Taylor, Congress Rejects EPA's Global Warming Claims,
HEARTLAND INSTITUTE, (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.heartland.org/article/29753/
Congress Rejects EPAs Global Warming Claims.html.
235. See id. (demonstrating congressional members skepticism of climate
change).
236. See Peters, supra note 15; Sanders, supra note 15.
237. See Aemorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 1-2, 6 (demonstrating
the intent of RGGI to increase costs and recognizing the potential affect on
consumers).
238. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 15.
239. See EPA Tramples State's Rights; Texas, Environment Suffers, AMERICANS
FOR PROSPERITY: TEXAS, http://www.americansforprosperitv.org/010411-epa-
tramples-states-rights-texans-environment-suffers (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
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Prevention Act.240 The bill, if passed, would remove the ability of
the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases or address climate change.241
Contemporaneously, President Obama's recent budget proposal strips
approximately $1.6 billion from the EPA, which will significantly
hinder the agency's ability to enforce Clean Air Act provisions.242
These reductions in federal environental protection programs want
to scale back EPA programs aimed at addressing climate control in
order to leave such endeavors within the states' control.2 43
Given the amount of control already retained by the states under
**244various environmental initiatives, this conclusion may be
unfounded. Much of the hostility toward these agencies is based on
views that environental regulation hurts economic job growth
within the United States. 245 RGGL a multistate initiative with extra-
regional effects, can be characterized as an obstacle to a struggling
job market.246 Due to the potential harm to out-of-region markets,
opponents of "oppressive" EPA regulation could be similarly averse
to ratifying a multistate compact that exhibits similar "evils."
Although chances of approval are at best unclear, it is unequivocal
240. See Republicans Launch Bill to Ax EPA Carbon Rules, REUTERS, Mar. 3.
2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128 3-20039060-54.htnl?tag-mncol;txt.
241. See id. As of September 2011. the Energy Tax Prevention Act was referred
to congressional committee; it has yet to be voted on. Energy Tax Prevention Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-si 12-482 (last
updated June 17, 2011).
242. See Jim Efstathiou Jr., EPA Budget Cut 1ill Restrict Enforcement of Clean-
Air Rules, Activists Say, BLOOMBERG (April 12, 2011, 1:35 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/epa-budget-cut-will-restrict-
enforcement-of-clean-air-ru les-activists-sav.htini.
243. See generally EPA Tramples State's Rights, supra note 239: U.S. SENATE
COMM. ON ENV'T. & PUB. WORKS, 112th Cong.. INHOFE JOINS UPTON,
INTRODUCES ENERGY TAX PREVENTION ACT, (Comm. Print 2011), available at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases&Cont
entRecord id=7d62b087-802a-23ad-41e4-93481b22c4a8&Region id=&Issue id=
(providing House and Senate members' comments on Energy Tax Prevention
Acts).
244. See e.g. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 252 (1976) (allowing states
the discretion to implement more stringent air quality standards than what is
required under the Clean Air Act).
245. See Broder, supra note 23 1; Peters., supra note 15; Sanders, supra note 15.
246. See Broder, supra note 231 (describing critics' characterizations of
environmental protection initiatives as damaging to a struggling economy).
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that the political atmosphere presents a considerable roadblock to
RGGI ratification.
Although express approval may be out of the realm of possibility,
the Clean Air Act (CAA) may have provided RGGI with implicit
congressional approval. When Congress supports a state in adopting
an interstate compact that may intrude on the federal sphere, courts
usually hold those agreements as impliedly ratified.247 The CAA's
State Implementation Plan (SIP) requirement may be the source of
this implicit approval.
Under the 1970 amendments to the CAA, "each State shall have
the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State . . . ."248 Once the EPA
establishes a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS), each
state must submit a SIP, detailing its implementation of that
standard.249 If such plan satisfies all relevant criteria then the EPA
"must approve" the proposal. 250 This allows the state to create more
stringent air quality standards regardless of their financial burden to
industries, as the CAA's purpose is to establish air quality standards
meant to drive innovations in clean industrial technologies. 25 1 The
EPA has previously authorized regional cap-and-trade systems for
nitrogen oxides in the Ozone Transport Region (OTR) NOx Cap and
247. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); see e.g, Seelye v.
Stephens, No. 91-35847, 1992 WL 337674, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 8., 1992); Fairchild
Corp. v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., No. 18746, 2000 WL 124867, at *3 (Va.
Cir. Ct. January 11, 2000).
248. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (providing
history of the Clean Air Act).
249. See id. at 64-65.
250. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (emphasis added).
Under the Clean Air Act, each state must formulate an implementation plan
tailored to achieve national primary ambient air quality standards as "expeditiously
as practicable but... in no case later than three years from the date of approval." Id.
at 246 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)). A state must also formulate an
implantation plan designed to achieve secondary ambient air standards within a
"reasonable time." If the EPA finds that the state's implementation plan is tailored
to attain those air quality standards, they must approve that implementation plan.
Id.
251. See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 266.
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Allowance Trading Program.252 The EPA approved this program in
an amended SIP, and it became a federally enforceable cap-and-trade
program for nitrous oxide emissions.253 In assachusetts v. EPA, the
Supreme Court held that the EPA has the power to regulate
greenhouse gases.254 Shortly after the Supreme Court's 2007 ruling,
the EPA announced forthcoming regulations regarding carbon
dioxide in an effort to address climate change.255 As the EPA has
previously authorized regional cap-and-trade systems for nitrogen
oxides (NOx), and is required to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
under the CAA, states are impliedly authorized to implement carbon
cap-and-trade programs to meet air quality standards established for
carbon dioxide. 256
The CAA's broad grant of authority to the states to formulate a
plan to address designated pollutants may be the advance ratification
RGGI states need. The EPA has already made calls for states to draft
implementation plans for addressing greenhouse gases, going so far
as to propose a federal implementation plan for Texas after rejecting
its submission.257 Signatory states under the CAA must create
greenhouse gas standards, and so long as the RGGI program satisfies
all the criteria, the EPA must approve such plan.258  This would
include instances in which RGGI places higher burdens on capping
greenhouse gas emissions than the NAAQS mandates. 259 Because
the EPA encourages states to engage in such activities, and each state
252. See Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Control Regulations, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
ne/airquality/nox.html (last visited April 18, 2011).
253. See id.
254. Massachusetts. v. EPA., 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (finding CAA gave
EPA the ability to regulate greenhouse gases as an air pollutant).
255. See Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011. H.R. 910. 112th Cong. § 4 (2011).
256. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29: Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)
Control Regulations., supra note 252 (stating that EPA has previously approved
NOx cap-and-trade understate SIPs).
257. See EPA Tramples State's Rights: Texas Environment Suffers. supra note
239.
258. See Jeffrey W. Johnson, EPA Sets Schedule for CO 2 Regulation, CHEM. &
ENG'G. NEWs, (Jan 3, 2011), http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/89/iO 1/8901notwx6.html.
259. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 252 (1976) (holding that EPA
must approve SIP that meet minimum criteria including if the SIP is more stringent
than necessary).
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is responsible for setting and enforcing its own carbon emissions cap,
RGGI may already have secured federal consent.260
The interplay between the CAA and FPA is central to this issue.
The CAA should not be interpreted as a blanket license for states to
engage activities otherwise prohibited under other statutes. Because
RGGI potentially crosses FERC's exclusive authority to determine
the "just and reasonable" prices, the availability of the CAA as a
defense is limited.26' Courts would be hesitant to find congressional
consent, implied or otherwise, for states to engage in conduct that is
contradictory to other statutory schemes.262 Therefore, although the
CAA grants broad power to the states to implement the NAAQS, it is
highly unlikely that they have the power to violate well-established
precedent under the filed rate doctrine.263 Consequently, the CAA is
a potential but unlikely source of consent, and RGGI may still lack
Congressional ratification.
b. Take the Money and Run: The Benefits of Obtaining
Congressional Consent
Besides remedying RGGI's various constitutional issues,
congressional consent has several additional benefits. Most obvious
would be the establishment of the RGGI agreement as federal law,
which opens up opportunities for federal enforcement in instances of
a state's non-compliance.264  Another added benefit would be the
ability of RGGI states to use more binding language and grant
broader powers to third party organization such as the RO.265 In light
260. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64-66 (1975)
(providing analysis for operation of CAA).
261. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. of Snohomish Cnty Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d
1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the filed rate doctrine).
262. See Cuyler v. Adams., 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981) (holding that implied
congressional consent can be found through encouraging a state to establish a
certain regulatory scheme).
263. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64-66 (discussing a state's obligations under the
CAA).
264. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 439.
265. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1976) (stating that establishment of a regional organization is indicative of a
compact needing consent).
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of states' recent raids on their individual allowance funds, such
powers may be desirable.266
The moment Congress consents to an interstate agreement, it is
transformed into federal law.267 This means that the participating
states, for which the agreement would be binding, would not be able
to alter these statutes as a matter of federal preemption. 268  This
remedy is particularly beneficial to a regional cap-and-trade system.
When a state withdraws from a cap-and-trade system, lifting
whatever limitations it had imposed upon carbon dioxide emissions,
those gases are able to move in and out of its borders. 269  This
imposes higher concentrations of greenhouse gases on those states
that are attempting to limit the quantities within their own borders.270
Thus, one state's withdrawal can consequently frustrate the attempts
of signatories to mitigate CO 2 emissions, forcing them to lower their
caps and create heavier burdens on their own emitters. 271 If RGGI
had status as a federal law, then the participating states would be
locked in, and could not withdraw for risk that such retraction would
be contradictory to federal law and therefore preempted. 272  This
provides both security to signatory states as well as foreseeability for
the businesses within them.27 3 Withdrawal, and the aftershocks it can
create, is a very real problem facing RGGI. New Hampshire is
attempting to withdraw from the RGGI, and Governor Christie of
266. An obvious drawback to having more restrictive language is that certain
states may be scared away from the agreement due to fears of being locked into a
compact after a new political party has come into power.
267. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440-41 (stating that upon approval the state law
becomes federal law).
268. See id.
269. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 9 (requiring a
reworking of state caps upon member withdrawal).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Cyler, 449 U.S. at 440-41 (obtaining congressional approval allows
interstate agreements to become federal law).
273. See Letter to NH State Senators, NEW ENGLAND CLEAN ENERGY COUNCIL
(April 28, 2011), http://ww.cleanenergycouncil.org/files/
NECEC RGGILetter%20to%20NH%20Senate FINA L%20Apri 1%2028%20201
1.pdf.
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New Jersey has already repealed RGGI legislation. 274 New Jersey
alone accounts for 1/6 of the total allowable emissions under the
MOU, making its regional contribution to greenhouse gas emissions
narrowly third only to New York and Massachusetts. 275
Consent injects a binding element into the agreement, allowing for
judicial recourse for failure to abide by the initiatives tenns. In this
context, individual state consumer benefit fund raids a la New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York could be challenged in
court.276 Consent could make binding the MOU's requirement that
states devote 25% of funds toward consumer benefit initiatives. 277
Any state's failure to respect this requirement would be actionable. 278
These raids have harmed the overall image of RGGI by fueling the
criticism that the program is a tax,27 9 therefore it is in the interest of
participating states to prevent them.2 80 By enforcing its provisions,
participating states can maintain RGGI as an environmental
initiative, without the taint of being just another revenue generator.
A second benefit to obtaining congressional consent would be the
creation of a third party compliance assurance agency through the
grant of broader enforcement powers to the RO.28 1 Under U.S. Steel,
interference with the normal sovereignty of a state through an
enforcement mechanism is a strong indicator that an interstate
274. See Baker, supra note 74 (reporting New Hampshire Senate's vote on
RGGI); Landrigan., supra note 71 (reporting the passage of a bill to withdraw New
Hampshire from RGGI); Navarro, supra note 14 (reporting New Jersey's expected
withdrawal).
275. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 3, 8 (stating
emissions caps in signatory states).
276. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440-41 (limiting a state's ability to alter a
congressional approved interstate compact); See Peters, supra note 15; States Raid
RGGI Funds to Fill Budget Gaps, supra note 15.
277. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440-41; Craig, supra note 82, at826-27 (providing
the benefits of consent); Iemorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at 6.
278. See e.g, Cuyler., 449 U.S. at 440-41 ;Craig., supra note 82, at 826-27.
279. See Navarro, supra note 14; Broder, supra note 231.
280. See Peters, supra note 15; Sanders, supra note 15.
281. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1976) (establishing a factor based determination for necessity of congressional
consent).
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compact requires congressional consent.282 Flowing from
congressional consent is the approval to formulate a stronger RO, or
even to utilize the EPA, as a compliance mechanism.283 Forming a
more empowered RO allows for the organization to settle
inconsistencies between the states and create more uniform
guidelines. 284  Certain RGGI states, in particular Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, are familiar with
regional cap-and-trade programs.285 The OTR Cap and Allowance
Trading Program received federal approval and as such was
enforceable.286 Because OTR was federally approved in an amended
SIP, the EPA could enforce its provisions.287 Similarly, if RGGI
secured congressional consent, its transformation into federal law
would make it EPA-enforceable. 288  Such centralization of
enforcement could be beneficial given the various policing issues
RGGI has encountered in withdrawal and raiding. The enforcement
powers that could follow from federal approval of RGGI could act as
a remedy for many of the recent problems that have surfaced since
the program's inception.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Climate change presents a significant threat to the fiscal and
physical health of the United States. Dangers such as rising sea
levels, decreased biodiversity, and increased mosquito habitation
deserve swift action from state and federal governments.289 Despite
the increasing need for action, RGGI signatories stand in the minority
as some of the few states that have taken demonstrable measures to
282. See id. (stating that the existence of a third party organization with
enforcement powers can trigger the Compact Clause).
283. See U.S. Steel Corp. 434 U.S. at 472-73 Memorandum of Understanding,
supra note 10, at 7-8.
284. See Craig, supra note 81, at 826-27.
285. See Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Control Regulations, supra note 251 (discussing
the OTR Cap and Allowance Trading Program).
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1981) (detailing the benefits of
congressional consent).
289. See GORE, supra note 3; Biodiversity, supra note 3.
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mitigate these risks. Furthermore, the Constitution and a long line of
precedent represent significant obstacles to regional carbon dioxide
cap-and-trade initiatives such as RGGI. Without congressional
consent and resulting federal enforceability, RGGI may be defeated
in either the courts or in its own implementation. Political climate
also acts as a potential roadblock for RGGI, especially since the Tea
Party and Republican legislatures have begun to show considerable
hostility toward similar initiatives. This leaves RGGI on extremely
shaky ground.
As a final note, a reminder to the reader of the 1958 movie "The
Blob." Upon discovering that only cold can defeat the Blob, Steve,
the film's hero, has the alien dumped in the Arctic. 290 A police
officer asks Steve if the frozen environment will hold the monster, to
which he replied, "So long as the Arctic stays cold." 29 1 The longer
the debate over climate change continues, the harder it will be to
prevent significant ecological disaster. We would be wise to
consider: if the trillions of dollars of property at risk is not a
sufficient incentive, maybe fear of the Blob's return will be.
290. THE BLOB (Paramount Pictures 1958).
291. Id.
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